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Casenote

A New Era of Dead-Beat Dads: Determining
Social Security Survivor Benefits for
Children Who Are Posthumously Conceived*

1
the United States Court of Appeals for
In Gillett-Nettingv. Barnhart,
the Ninth Circuit held that posthumously conceived children born to a
married couple were dependent under the Social Security Act 2 ("Act")
and entitled to child's survivor benefits.' The posthumously conceived
children in Gillett-Netting were born as a result of an in vitro fertilization process conducted after the husband's death.4 After the birth of her
twins, the mother filed for benefits under the Act based on her late
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1. 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C § 401 (2000).
4. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594.
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husband's earnings.5 The court ruled that because the twins were their
father's legitimate children under Arizona law, they were to be
considered his dependents under the Act and were entitled to child's
insurance benefits.' The case was one of first impression because
neither federal law nor Arizona law dealt with legal issues created by
posthumous conception, which is now possible through developing
reproductive technology.'
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Rhonda Gillett-Netting and Robert Netting were a married couple who
had experienced infertility problems while trying to conceive a child.8
Several months after their marriage, Gillett-Netting and Netting began
trying to conceive a child. Gillett-Netting's medical conditions created
fertility problems and caused her to suffer two miscarriages. As a result
Gillett-Netting began fertility treatments.9
In December of 1994, Netting was diagnosed with multiple myeloma
cancer. The couple decided to continue with their reproductive efforts.
Netting's physician recommended that he undergo chemotherapy
treatment for the cancer. Because the chemotherapy treatments would
have rendered him sterile, Netting delayed treatment so he could deposit
his semen at the medical lab, where it was frozen and stored for later
use in Gillett-Netting's fertility treatments. Netting was aware that his
stored sperm could be used to impregnate his wife even after his
death.'0
Throughout Netting's illness, Gillett-Netting continued with her
fertility treatments. She maintained that Netting told her that he
wanted her to try to conceive a child even if he died. On February 4,
After Netting's death, Gillett-Netting
1995, Netting passed away.
attempted the artificial insemination procedure several times without
success." After these failed attempts, Gillett-Netting's doctor advised

5. Id. at 595.
6. Id. at 593.
7. Id. at at 595-96.
8. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963 (D. Ariz. 2002). The couple
was married in 1993. Id. at 963. Robert Netting was a professor of anthropology at the
University of Arizona. Walter Sullivan, Robert Netting, 60, Who Showed Societies' Links
to Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at B10. Rhonda Gillett-Netting is also an
anthropology professor at the University of Arizona. Mitra Taj, Prof Wins Benefits for
Children Conceived After Spouse's Death, ARIZONA DAILY WILDCAT, June 23, 2004, at
http://wildcat.arizona.edu/papers/97/153/01_3.html.
9. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 963.
10. Id. at 963; Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594.
11. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 963.
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her to try in vitro fertilization using Netting's frozen sperm.1 2 The in
vitro fertilization of Gillett-Netting's eggs with Netting's sperm was
successfully performed in December of 1995. The resulting embryos
were transferred to Gillett-Netting and a positive pregnancy test was
noted a couple of weeks later. In August of 1996, over a year after
Gillett-Netting gave birth to twins, naming them Juliet
Netting's death,
13
and Piers.
Following his death, Netting's estate was distributed and GillettNetting filed an application for child's insurance benefits for Juliet and
Piers based on Netting's past earnings. 4 Gillett-Netting's claim for
insurance benefits for Juliet and Piers was made pursuant to 402(d) of
the Act. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied the claim.'5
Subsequently, Gillett-Netting filed a request for a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), who also denied her claim. The ALJ
held that Juliet and Piers were not entitled to benefits because they
were not dependent on Netting at the time of his death. According to
the ALJ, children conceived after the wage earner's death cannot be
for
deemed dependent on the wage earner. Gillett-Netting's request
16
review with the Social Security Appeals Council was denied.
Thereafter, Gillett-Netting filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the ALJ's decision
denying Juliet and Piers the insurance benefits was "not supported by
substantial evidence, was not in accordance with the law, and denied
them equal protection of the laws." 7 The district court granted
summary judgment for the Commissioner, stating that "Juliet and Piers
do not qualify for child's insurance benefits because they are not
Netting's 'children' under the Act and they were not dependent on
Netting at the time of his death[,]" and "that Juliet's and Piers's right
to equal protection of the laws was not violated by applying the Act to

12. Id. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines "in vitro fertilization"as "[a] procedure by
which an egg is fertilized outside a woman's body and then inserted into the womb for
gestation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 846 (8th ed. 2004). This should be distinguished
from "artificial insemination," which is defined as "[a] process for achieving conception,
whereby semen is inserted into a woman's vagina by some means other than intercourse."
Id. at 121. See generally 5 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAw § 22.06[1], [2] (Alexander M.
Capron & Irwin M. Birnbaum eds., 2004); RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE
EVOLVING FAMILY (Temple University Press 2004) [hereinafter BRASHIER, INHERITANCE
LAW].

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 963; Gillett-Netting,371 F.3d at 595.
Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 964.
Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595.
Id.
Id.
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deny them child's insurance benefits."" Gillett-Netting then appealed
the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.19
II.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Modern Assisted Reproduction

In recent years scientists have made significant advancements in
medical technologies to assist with reproduction. The first child
conceived by artificial insemination was in 1978, and a child conceived
by in vitro fertilization shortly followed.2" Current technology allows
for the reproduction of a child using only one partner's genetic material.
Technological advances also allow for reproduction of a child using a
decedent's genetic materials. 2' According to one estimate, about 60,000
births occurred each year in the United States as a result of artificial
insemination.2 2 Scientists speculate that the next step in reproductive
technology of humans will be through cloning.23 The parents of
children conceived by any of these means of artificial reproductive
technology may be single or married, and the process may take place
before or after the death of either one or both parents.

18. Id. Gillett-Netting also argued that the ALJ's decision denying Juliet and Piers
child's benefits denied their equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment by (1)
creating an "impenetrable barrier" to child's benefits based on the circumstances of the
children's births, and (2) "relying on a classification that does not bear a substantial
relationship to an important governmental objective." GiUett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at
969. The equal protection challenge was based on the Commissioner's incorporation of
Arizona intestacy laws to determine eligibility for survivor's benefits, which Gillett-Netting
argued had the affect of treating biological children differently than other children due to
the circumstances of their birth. Id. at 969.
The district court rejected Gillett-Netting's equal protection challenge. Id. at 969-70.
According to the trial court, the alleged discrimination was more appropriately characterized as one between biological children in existence at the time of the decedent's death and
those not in existence. Id. at 970. The district court held that this classification did not
involve a fundamental right or a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Id. Thus, relying on
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507 (1976), the
district court found that SSA's conditioning entitlement to benefits upon dependency at the
time of death and applying a state's intestacy laws to determine dependency is "entirely
rational." Id. (citations omitted).
19. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595.
20. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 12, at 168.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. In 1996 scientists successfully cloned Dolly the sheep. Id.
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The Social Security Act

Amidst the Great Depression and the Industrial Revolution, the Act
was signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on August 14,
1935. The Act contained several provisions for general welfare and
created a social insurance program designed to pay retired workers a
continuing income after retirement. The original Act provided only
retirement benefits to the workers. In 1939 the Act was amended in a
significant way by adding survivor benefits paid to the family of a
covered worker in the event of his premature death.24 The modern
purpose of the Act is to provide support for dependents of disabled or
deceased workers.2 5 The Act is remedial; therefore, it is to be liberally
construed to effectuate its purpose.
C.

Eligibility for Child's Benefits Under the Social Security Act

A child of an otherwise eligible insured worker may qualify for child's
benefits on the earnings record of an insured worker if the applicant
proves his status as a "child" of the worker and meets certain other
requirements. 2' Notably, the child must be or have been dependent
upon the insured parent. 2' The applicant's status as "child" of the
insured is based on the child's relationship to the insured including: the
insured's natural child, child with intestacy rights, illegitimate child,
adopted child, stepchild, grandchild, or step-grandchild. 29 Generally,
a legitimate child is presumed to be dependent upon his natural
parents.3" A child is automatically deemed dependent upon his natural
father or adopting father or his natural mother or adopting mother

24. BriefHistory of Social Security, 20, 23-24, available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html.
25. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1987); Doran v. Schweiker, 681
F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1982).
26. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Smith, 820
F.2d at 1095-97 (holding that the insured's child was eligible for survivor benefits by
satisfying the Act's support test for determining dependency under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ui) even though the support was provided to the mother in very early stages of her
pregnancy without knowledge of the pregnancy because this was consistent with the
purposes of the Act); Doran, 681 F.2d at 607-09 (helping unwed mother in first trimester
of pregnancy move to cabin and repairing cabin roof constituted sufficient contributions to
satisfy the support requirements for an unborn child under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii),
considering father's economic circumstances).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2000); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.350 - 368 (2004).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).
29. See 42 U.S.C § 416(e) (2000); 20 CFR §§ 404.354 - 365.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3); 20 C.F.R. § 404.361(a).
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unless, at the time of the insured's death or disability onset, the insured
was not living with or contributing to the support of such child and (1)
the "child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individu32
al,"31 or (2) "the child had been adopted by some other individual."
The status of legitimacy is determined by state law based on a
determination of whether the child could inherit the insured's personal
3
property as the insured's natural child under state inheritance laws.
Legitimate children born after the wage-earning parent's death or
disability onset are entitled to benefits regardless of whether they lived
with or were supported by the parent at the time of his death or
disability onset. 4 Under § 402(d)(1)(C)(ii), a child of an insured
deceased individual is entitled to child's insurance benefits if the child
3
was dependent upon the insured at the time of the insured's death.
In the situation of children born posthumously" or after the death
of the father, the child may still be eligible for benefits under the Act if
3
they were dependent upon the father at the time of the father's death.
The Program Operations Manual System ("POMS"), the internal
operating instructions used by SSA field employees when processing
claims for Social Security benefits, sets out a policy for children
38
The claim processors are
conceived after the insured's death.
instructed that "[a] child conceived by artificial means after the
[insured's] death .. .can only be entitled [for benefits] if he or she has
39
inheritance rights under applicable State intestacy law." SSA claim
processors are further instructed to submit all cases to the Regional
4
Chief Counsel for an opinion determining the child's status. " Based
on the Act, however, the dependency of posthumously conceived children
is determined in the same manner as for other children. First, if the

31. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A).
32. Id. § 402(d)(3)(B).
33. Id. § 416(h)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1), (3); Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 634-35.
35. Id. § 402(d)(1)(C)(ii).
36. Id. See generally Catherine R. Lazuran, PosthumousIllegitimate Child As "Child"
Entitled to Survivor's Benefits Under § 216 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 416),
36 A.L.R.

Fed. 166 (1994); KATHLEEN SHANNON GLANCY, SOCIAL SECURITY PRACTICE

GUIDE § 3.06 (Lori Wood ed., 2004).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C)(ii). See generally Lazuran, supra note 36; GLANCY, supra
note 36.
38. SSA's Program Operations Manual System, "About POMS" at http://policy.ssa.gov/
poms.nsf/aboutpoms; SSA's Program Operations Manual System, GN 00306.001 "Determining Status as Child" at http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200306001 [hereinafter
Determining Status as Child].
39. Determining Status as Child, supra note 38.
40. Id.
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child is "legitimate" under state intestacy laws, then the child will be
presumed dependent on his natural parents and consequently eligible for
survivor benefits.4 1 Whether a posthumous child is legitimate is
determined by reference 4to2 the state law where the decedent is domiciled
at the time of his death.
However, if the child is not deemed legitimate under state law, the
illegitimate child may still be considered dependent if the child meets
the other qualifying provisions in the Act. Under §§ 416(h)(1)(B) and
416(h)(2)(B), the child of an applicant whose parents went through a
marriage ceremony resulting in a purported marriage between them
that, but for a legal defect not known to the parents at the time of such
ceremony, would have been a valid marriage is entitled to benefits.43
Also, under § 416(h)(3)(C)(i), an illegitimate child is deemed to be the
child of the insured individual under the Act if the insured individual (1)
acknowledged the child in writing, (2) obtained a court decree stating the
insured is a parent of the child, or (3) obtained a court decree stating
that the insured has been ordered by a court to contribute to the child's
support because the child is the insured individual's son or daughter.44
Alternatively, under § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii), an illegitimate child may prove
dependency if the child can show that the insured individual "was living
with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such
insured individual died."45 If an illegitimate child is unable to meet
any of these deemed dependency exceptions, the child is barred from
receiving benefits under the Act.46
D. Constitutionalityof ClassificationsBased on Legitimacy Under
the Social Security Act
The classification of illegitimate children for purposes of receiving
survivor's benefits under the Act has been upheld as constitutional.4 7
In Mathews v. Lucas,4" the United States Supreme Court held that

41. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A).
42. Id. If the individual is not domiciled in any state at the time of his death, then the
intestacy laws of the District of Columbia apply. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i).
44. Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i).
45. Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii).
46. See Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 631 n.2.
47. Id. at 637-38. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). See generally Timothy G.
Barrett, Note, Is DiscriminationAgainst Illegitimate Children Worthy of Stricter Scrutiny
Under the Constitution?-The RelationshipBetween State Intestate SuccessionStatutes and
the Social Security Act In Claims for Child Benefits for Illegitimate Children, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAm. L. 79 (1995).
48. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
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strict judicial scrutiny of the Act's classifications of illegitimate children
is not required.4 9 In Mathews a wage earner's two illegitimate children
were denied survivorship benefits under the Act because they were
unable to prove actual dependency. The children were born out of
wedlock to the wage earner. The decedent father's paternity of the
applicants was not contested. The decedent father, however, did not live
in the same household with the applicants at the time of his death, and
there was no evidence that he contributed to their support. Consequently, the applicants were unable to prove actual dependency under the Act.
The applicants appealed the denial of benefits as a violation of the equal
protection provisions under the Fifth Amendment."
The Supreme Court rejected the children's Fifth Amendment challenge
to the classification of illegitimate children under the Act.' The Court
held that the Act's discrimination of individuals based on their
legitimacy by only requiring illegitimate children to prove actual
dependency on the parent in order to be eligible for survivor benefits was
not deserving of strict scrutiny.5 2 The Court reasoned that the classification of illegitimate children under the Act was not deserving of extra
53
Rather, strict
constitutional protection given to suspect classes.
judicial scrutiny would apply to suspect classes, defined as a group
"'saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."'54 Furthermore, the classifications of
illegitimates for determining dependency under the Act served an
administrative convenience because the dependency presumptions for
legitimate children enabled Congress to avoid the burden and expense
of case-by-case determinations of dependency.55
Cases Involving the Status of Posthumously Conceived Children
Few cases address benefits under the Act for posthumously conceived
children.5" However, there are statutes and cases addressing posthuE.

49. Id. at 504-08.
50. Id. at 497-503.
51. Id. at 504-11.
52. Id. at 504, 506.
53. Id. at 506.
54. Id. at 506 n.13 (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
55. Id. at 509. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975).
56. In Gillett-Netting the court noted the scarcity of federal and state laws addressing
the issues raised by developing reproductive technology: "Neither the Social Security Act
nor the Arizona family law that is relevant to determining whether Juliet and Piers have
a right to child's insurance benefits makes clear the rights of children conceived
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mous children conceived before the insured's death. For instance, in
Smith v. Heckler,5 ' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
illegitimate posthumous child conceived before the decedent's death was
to benefits under the Act based on 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)entitled
58
(ii).
In Smith the decedent father was the paramour of the child's mother.
During their relationship the decedent lived with the child's mother and
provided financial support for the mother's household expenses. The
mother confirmed her pregnancy a day after the decedent's suicide.59
The court held that the child was an eligible dependent because the
insured was the father of plaintiff and was contributing to the support
of the child at the time of death."0 Under the support test of § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii), "a child who does not fit into the statutory 'deemed dependency' presumptions can establish dependency by showing that the
insured deceased parent is (1) the father of the claimant and (2) was
living with or contributing to the support of the child at the time of
death."6 1 Reasoning that the Act is to be construed liberally and its
purpose is to provide support for dependents of deceased workers, the
court concluded the support requirements were met even though the
financial support given to the mother was not made with scienter of the
fact that she was pregnant with his child.62 The court of appeals held
that intent by the decedent to provide for the unborn child was not
with the purpose of the Act,
required because it was inconsistent
63
especially so early in the pregnancy.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dealt with similar issues
in Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security." In Woodward a
married couple was informed that the husband had leukemia and that
the necessary medical treatment would make him sterile. The husband
had his sperm medically withdrawn and preserved for the purpose of
their use to artificially inseminate his wife. Two years after the
husband's death, the wife gave birth to twins as a result of the artificial

posthumously." 371 F.3d at 595-96. The court also observed that no circuit court had
previously dealt with the issue presented in Gillett-Netting of survivor benefits for
posthumously conceived children. Id. at 596 n.3.
57. 820 F.2d 1093 (1987).
58. Id. at 1095.
59. Id. at 1094.
60. Id. at 1096-97.
61. Id. at 1095.
62. Id. at 1095-97.
63. Id.
64. 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). This case was noted in Gillett-Netting as a "wellreasoned opinion." 371 F.3d at 596 n.3.
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insemination process. The wife's claims for Social Security survivor
benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) and mother's benefits under
§ 402(g)(1) were rejected by the SSA on the grounds that the wife had
not established that the twins were the deceased husband's "children"
within the meaning of the Act because they were not entitled to
inheritance benefits under Massachusetts state law.6 5
The wife
appealed the decision to the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, which certified the state law issue regarding
inheritance rights to the Massachusetts Supreme Court.6"
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged an absence
of statutory directives addressing the issue and formulated a test for
determining whether posthumously conceived genetic children would
have inheritance rights in Massachusetts. 7 The court emphasized that
neither Massachusetts courts nor the United States Supreme Court had
addressed the question of posthumously conceived children's inheritance
rights under state intestacy laws.6" The court determined that, in
order for a posthumously conceived child to enjoy the inheritance rights
of a natural child under Massachusetts law, the surviving parent or the
child's other legal representative must both (1) demonstrate a genetic
relationship between the child and the decedent, and (2) prove that the
decedent "affirmatively consented to posthumous conception and to the
support of any resulting child."69 Even when these requirements are
met, the court acknowledged that time limitations could preclude a claim
for inheritance rights for a posthumously conceived child.7"
The New Jersey Superior Court addressed similar issues in In re
Estate of Kolacy.7" In that case plaintiff's husband died of leukemia.
Almost a year after his death, plaintiff used her deceased husband's
stored sperm to have his children, twin girls, by artificial insemination.
Plaintiff brought an action for a declaration by the Superior Court of
New Jersey that her posthumously implanted twins were eligible as the
deceased husband's heirs so that they would be entitled to children's

65.

Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259-61

66. Id. at 260-61.
67. Id. at 261 nn.8-9.
68. Id. at 261 n.9. The court noted two cases that addressed related issues: Hecht v.
Super. Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 847 (1993) (addressing whether a decedent's sperm was

"property" that could be bequeathed to his girlfriend) and In Re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d
1257 (2000) (see discussion supra Part II.E.).
69. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272.

70. Id. The issue of time limitations was not within the scope of the issue certified by
the district court. Id. at 267-68.
71.

753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000)

2005]

DEAD-BEAT DADS

769

benefits under the Act.72 Because the father unequivocally expressed
his desire that plaintiff use his sperm to conceive children after his
death, the court held that the children were the legal heirs of the
deceased father under state law.73 The court reasoned that holding
otherwise would have an adverse impact on their legal and social
status. 74 The opinion did not address whether the children would be
eligible for Social Security benefits but recognized that their status as
heirs would impact their eligibility for benefits under the Act. 5
F

Arizona Legitimacy and Child Support Laws

In Gillett-Netting the interpretation of the Act's definition of a child
eligible for Social Security benefits depended on whether the child could
inherit the insured's personal property as the insured's natural child
under state inheritance laws.76 While Arizona law does not specifically
deal with the rights of posthumously conceived children, Arizona law
provides that every Arizona child is the legitimate child of their natural
parents. 77 Arizona law does not make legal distinctions based on
Arizona's Child Support Guidelines7 9 provide, in
illegitimacy.7"
applicable part, that "every person has the duty to provide all reasonable
support for that person's natural and adopted minor, unemancipated
Additionally, children born as the result of artificial
children."80
insemination are entitled to support from their mother's spouse if the
spouse is the children's biological father or if the spouse agreed in
writing to the insemination.81
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
district court and held that the posthumously conceived children in
8 2
were conclusively deemed dependent on
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart
their father under the Act, and entitled to child's survivor benefits based

72. Id. at 1258-59.
73. Id. at 1263-64.
74. Id. at 1262.
75. Id. at 1259.
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.355.
77. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-601) (2004)).
78. Id. at 598 (citing State v. Mejia, 399 P.2d 116 (Ariz. 1965); citing ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 8-601; citing Hurt v. Super. Ct., 601 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Ariz. 1979)).
79. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-501 (2004).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
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In reaching this result, the Ninth Circuit first
on his earnings. s
addressed whether the children were entitled to child's insurance
benefits under the Act. 4 To recover child's insurance benefits under
the Act, the child must meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)." 5 Under § 402 every child of an insured individual who meets the
definition of child under § 416(e) is entitled to benefits if the following
requirements are met: (1) the claimant meets the definition of "child"
under § 416(e); (2) the child or the child's representative has filed an
application for survivor benefits; (3) the child is unmarried and a minor
at the time of application; and (4) the child was dependent on the
insured at the time of the insured's death.8
The court of appeals concluded that Juliet and Piers met these
requirements because Netting was fully insured under the Act when he
died, Juliet and Piers were his biological children and unmarried minors,
and the application for their child's insurance benefits was filed by his
Because the court of appeals determined that
widow, their mother.8
Juliet and Piers were the legitimate children of Netting under Arizona
law, they were deemed dependent on him under the Act and consequently entitled to benefits.88
Contrary to the district court's holding and the Commissioner's
assertion, the court of appeals concluded that Juliet and Piers were
Netting's "children" for purposes of the Act.89 The court of appeals
determined that the Act's definition of "child" was broad, including the
insured person's stepchild, grandchild, or step-grandchild in certain
circumstances.90 Additionally, courts and the SSA have interpreted the
word "child," as used in the definition of child in the Act, to "mean the
natural, or biological, child of the insured."91

83. Id. at 593.
84. Id. at 596.
85. Id.; Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1987).
86. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (defining child as "the child
or legally adopted child of an individual").
87. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 781 n.12 (1975) (noting that a
"natural or adopted child" of an insured was not required to satisfy the nine-month time
requirement to which stepchildren are subject); Tsosie v. Califano, 630 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th
Cir. 1980) (holding that the term "child" under 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) includes a person's
natural children and his legally adopted children); 20 C.F.R. § 404.354 (stating that a
claimant may be "entitled to benefits as [an insured person's] child, i.e., as a natural child,
legally adopted child, stepchild, grandchild, stepgrandchild, or equitably adopted child").
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When the children are not recognized as legitimate under state law,
the Act's provisions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2) and (3) provide
additional means for children to be considered as dependent on the wage
earner.9 2 The appellate court held the district court erred by holding
that "child" was further defined under 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2) and (3). 93
The appellate court ruled that 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2) and (3) are not
intended as a test of parentage, but rather serve an additional means for
providing dependency for children who are determined illegitimate under
state law.94
Under these sections of the Act, a claimant whose parentage is in
dispute is considered the insured's child if one of the following requirements is met: (1) the property law in the state where the insured
resided at death provides that the child would be entitled to take an
estate share of the insured's property; (2) the child's parents' marriage
ceremony was flawed by a legal impediment unknown to them at the
time of marriage, without which there would have been a valid
marriage; (3) the insured has acknowledged the claimant as his or her
child in writing; (4) the insured, before his or her death, had been
decreed by a court to be the parent of the claimant; (5) the insured,
before his or her death, had been ordered by a court to contribute to the
claimant's support because the claimant was his or her child; or (6) there
is evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner that the insured was the
parent of the claimant, and was living with or contributing to the
support of the claimant at the time that the insured died.96 In GillettNetting parentage was not disputed because both parties and the district
court conceded that Juliet and Piers were Netting's biological children.9" Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the district court
erred by holding that Juliet and Piers were not Netting's children for
purposes of the Act.97
Having determined that Juliet and Piers were "children" within the
scope of the Act under § 402(d)(1), the court then addressed the

92. See supra Part II.B.
93. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596-97.
94. Id. at 596-98. The court also noted that "[aln illegitimate child who does not meet
one of these requirements can be deemed legitimate and dependent if she demonstrates
both parentage and actual dependency, that is, that the 'insured individual was living with
or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died.'"
Id. at 598 n.6 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3), 416(h)(3)(C).
95. Id. at 597. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2).
96. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597.
97. Id. at 596-97 (citing Tsosie, 630 F.2d at 1333) (noting that "child" includes any
biological child of the insured wage earner).
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dependency requirement of § 416(e).98 The court of appeals agreed with
the district court that Juliet and Piers could not establish actual
dependency on Netting because they were not in existence at the time
of his death.99 However, the court of appeals held that proof of actual
dependency by Juliet and Piers on Netting was not required under the
Act because all of the insured's legitimate children are automatically
considered to be dependent on the insured, absent narrow circumstances
not present in Gillett-Netting.'00
The court reasoned that dependency is a broad concept under the Act,
under which the vast majority of children are deemed dependent on their
deceased parent. 01
Typically, only completely unacknowledged
illegitimate children must prove actual dependency in order to receive
child's insurance benefits.' 2 Additionally, the Act is read liberally to
make certain
that children receive financial support after the death of
03
a parent.
Because Juliet and Piers were considered legitimate children according
to Arizona state law, they were deemed dependent for purposes of the
Act, and therefore, entitled to survivor benefits from Netting. 04 The
court reasoned that if Netting were alive, Arizona law would treat him
as the natural parent of Juliet and Piers, and he would have a legal
obligation to provide for their support.' 5 Because the court concluded
that Juliet and Piers were entitled to benefits under the Act, the court
of appeals did not reach Gillett-Netting's equal protection claim,
regarding the preclusion of the award of child's insurance benefits to
posthumously conceived children.' 6

98. Id. at 597-98.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 598 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,502 (1976)
(noting that all legitimate children are entitled to survivorship benefits under the Act
regardless of their actual dependency status); Smith, 820 F.2d at 1094-95 (noting the
presumption of dependency for legitimate children unless the child is adopted by another);
Doran v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 606 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that the only
requirement for establishing eligibility for survivor benefits for children born of a
legitimate marriage is that such children demonstrate that the deceased parent was fully
insured)).
101. Id. (citing Smith, 820 F.2d at 1095; Doran, 681 F.2d at 607).
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Smith, 820 F.2d at 1095; Doran, 681 F.2d at 607). The court also noted
that the purpose of the Act is to provide support for dependents of disabled or deceased
workers. Id. (citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974)).
104. Id. at 599 (citing ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-501). See infra Part II.F.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 594 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). See supra note 18.
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In dicta the court of appeals indicated that a different result on the
issue of legitimacy would have been reached had Netting and GillettNetting not been married. °7 The court asserted that their holding did
not make survivorship benefits available to every posthumously
conceived child in Arizona on the basis of the earnings of a deceased
sperm donor. 8 The court posited that the father not married to the
mother of a child born posthumously as a result of sperm donation and
in vitro fertilization would not be obligated to support the child under
laws and would not be considered the child's
Arizona's child support
"natural parent."' 9 If the father is not considered the child's natural
parent, the Act's presumption of dependency based on Arizona's child
support laws would not apply. Such a child would only be eligible for
survivor benefits if the Commissioner determined the child was
dependent on the wage earner by meeting one of the qualifications under
42 U.S.C. § 416(h). 11
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Births resulting from the various forms of assisted reproduction bring
rise to a plethora of issues concerning parentage and inheritance
Many state inheritance laws and federal statutes have not
rights.'
directly addressed the implications of modern reproductive technology."2 The law is still catching up with the rapid growth in reproductive technology. Questions remain concerning the property rights of
reproductive materials (i.e., frozen sperm), the legality of paid surrogacy,
intestacy rights for posthumous children conceived or implanted after
and the determination of parentage and
the genetic parent's death,
3
custody of such children. "

107. Id. at 599 n.7.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-501).
110. Id.
111. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 12, at 168.
112. See generally BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 12, at 168-98; JANET L.
DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE
198-207 (1997).
113. See generally BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 12, at 168-98. In addition
to problems defining dependency in the modern reproduction era, the legal definition of
motherhood is in question. Sherry F. Colb, Who Gets Custody When the Fertility Clinic
Makes a Mistake?: The Hidden Sexism in Focusing on DNA, Find Law's Writ, Sept. 22,
2004, at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/colb/20040922.html. In September 2004 Susan
Buchweitz recovered a million dollar settlement from a fertility clinic that mistakenly gave
her an embryo intended for another family. Buchweitz, a single Californian who decided
to undergo artificial insemination to become a mother, gave birth to a child. Ten months
after the child's birth, Buchweitz found out that the doctor at the fertility clinic implanted
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Historically, state inheritance laws on intestate success usually
require that a child be "in being" at the time of a parent's death to be
considered an heir.'14 Case law and estate and property laws have
long addressed situations when a man causes a woman to become
pregnant and then dies before the child is born. They do not, however,
address the problems posed in estate law by current reproductive
technology by means of artificial insemination, traditional surrogacy,
gestational carriers, cloning, and gene splicing. Because laws have not
kept up with reproductive technology, the rights of posthumously
conceived children vary from state to state.
In order to bring about more predictability for the parents and
children affected by such assisted reproductive arrangements, state
legislatures and the SSA need to adopt laws and regulations to recognize
the realities of reproductive technologies. Various approaches are
possible.
Some states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act" 5 ("UPA"),
which was revised in 2000 and provides detailed rules for establishing
paternity and takes into account modem reproductive technologies." 6
The UPA takes the approach that if a spouse dies before the placement
of eggs, sperm, or embryos, and the materials result in a child, then the
1 7
deceased spouse is not considered a parent of any resulting child.
The UPA provides an exception when the deceased spouse consents in
a record that if assisted reproduction occurs after death, that the
deceased spouse would be a parent of the child." 8 The UPA drafters
recommended that any gestational agreements be reviewed by a court
in a manner similar to the review of adoptions and that nonvalidated

her with the wrong embryo. The embryo was intended for a married couple. Thus,
unknown to Buchweitz, she was a surrogate for an embryo created from the married
couple's sperm and egg. The intended recipients of the embryo have sued for custody of
the child. Both Buchweitz and the married couple claim parental rights and a genetic
connection to the child. The case raises questions of the meaning of "biological
motherhood," which involves both egg donation and pregnancy. Colb criticizes the
emphasis on DNA as a sole claim to biological motherhood, arguing that the rule of
pregnancy should also play an integral part in defining parenthood. Id.
114. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000); BRASHIER,
INHERITANCE LAW, supranote 12, at 186 (cautioning an abandonment of the "time-of-death"
rule because it could open claims not only from the decedent's own children conceived
posthumously but also from other relatives of the decedent born after the decedent's death).
See Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266 n.16 (Mass. 2002).
115. 2000 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 299 (2001).
116. Id. at § 707.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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gestational agreements be unenforceable. 19 Furthermore, the drafters
suggest that the validity of such gestational12agreements
determine the
0
resulting child's eligibility for child support.
In the case of frozen sperm or embryos, state laws should also address
a timeline for determining how long the unborn child can be brought
into existence and still be considered the child or heir of a decedent
parent. For example, a statute could provide that a child conceived by
artificial insemination after the death of one of the child's parents should
nonetheless be the heir of that deceased parent so long as the child is
born within a certain number of months following the parent's death.
However, time limitations are problematic because they pose significant
burdens on the surviving parent who may be in a mourning period.
Furthermore, the attempts at artificial insemination are costly and often
require multiple attempts before they are successful.' 2 ' States should
also consider the competing interests of people who are alive at the
decedent's death and expect the prompt distribution of the decedent's
estate. 122
Because the court's decision granting survivor benefits to Juliet and
Piers was based on state law, the national implications of survivor
benefits for posthumously conceived children remain to be seen. 2 '
Until state laws are modernized to keep pace with these issues
surrounding posthumously conceived children, the best advice for
potential parents is to effectuate an attorney-supervised plan that
protects the child's interest. The best advice for the courts is to read
federal and state laws with flexibility to take the children of assisted
reproduction into account. A suggestion for the Social Security
Administration is to adopt guidelines addressing child's survivor benefits
for posthumously conceived children, rather than relying on state
inheritance laws that lead to inconsistent results and allow for
119. Id. at art. 8 cmt.
120. Id. The Uniform Status of Children Assisted Conception Act takes a similar
approach with the stated goal of providing finality for the determination of parenthood
where genetic material is used in the procreation process after the death of the genetic
material's owner. Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act § 4(b), cmt. (1988).
121. See BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 12, at 194. See Woodward, 760
N.E.2d at 267-68 (refusing to adopt a statute of limitations for determining the inheritance
rights of posthumously conceived children but recognizing the importance of the limitations
question on the issue of the state intestacy statute's administrative goals).
122. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262.
123. According to Hagit Elul, lead attorney in GillettNetting and legal associate for the
law firm, Hughes, Hubbard and Reeves, who represented the case with the Center for
Reproductive Rights, the government has filed a motion for a rehearing. The motion is
pending. Telephone Interview with Hagit M. Elul, Associate, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed,
L.L.P. (November 11, 2004).
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discrimination against children based on the circumstances of their
birth.
ANN-PATTON NELSON

